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NOTES AND COMMENTS
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE ENFORCEMENT
OF NONMARITAL COHABITATION PROPERTY
RIGHTS: MARVIN v. MARVIN
I. INTRODUCTION

Historically, a cohabitating partner, unlike a putative' or common
law spouse,2 has not received favorable judicial treatment with regard to claims for enforcement of property rights against the other
cohabitating partner. A cohabitating partner, sometimes called a
"meretricious" spouse, is one who knowingly cohabits without marriage in a jurisdiction that does not recognize common law marriage,
or one who knowingly cohabits but does not meet the statutory
requirements in a jurisdiction which does recognize common law
partners claiming
marriage. Relief has been granted to cohabitating
3
property rights under a variety of legal theories including express
4
agreement (pooling of earnings agreement, oral trust,' partnership
6 and joint business enterprise'), implied in fact agreeagreement,
9
ment (implied contract for services' ), resulting trust, and constructive trust.' 0 Relief has also been extended through special statutory
schemes such as the California Family Law Act' 1 and the Minnesota
partition statutes.' 2 The use of these theories to recognize and en1. A putative spouse is one who has a good faith but mistaken belief that he or she has
entered into a valid marriage.
2. A common law spouse is recognized by statute. A common law marriage exists when
two persons have cohabited, holding themselves out as man and wife for a period of time set
by the statute. Only thirteen states (Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,
Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Texas) and the
District of Columbia recognize common law marriage.
3. For a detailed discussion of the legal theories under which recovery has been requested, see Folberg & Buren, Domestic Partnership:A ProposalFor Dividing The Property
of Unmarried Families, 12 Willamette L. J. 453, 460 (1976). See also Bruch, Property
Rights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on the Value of Homemakers'Services, 10
Fam. L. Q. 101, 155 (1976).
4. Trutalli v. Meraviglia, 215 Cal. 698, 12 P.2d 430 (1932).
5. Cluck v. Sheets, 141 Tex. 219, 171 S.W.2d 860 (1943).
6. Fernandez v. Garza, 88 Ariz. 214, 354 P.2d 260 (1960).
7. Garcia v. Venegas, 106 Cal. App. 2d 364, 235 P.2d 89 (1951).
8. Tyranski v. Piggins, 44 Mich. App. 570, 205 N.W.2d 595 (1973).
9. Walberg v. Mattson, 38 Wash. 2d 808, 232 P.2d 827 (1951).
10. Omer v. Omer, 11 Wash. App. 386, 523 P.2d 957 (1974).
11. In re Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973). The court in Marvin v.
Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976), subsequently rejected the
application of the California Family Law Act to cases involving nonmarried cohabitating
partners. Id. at 671, 557 P.2d at 120, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
-, 256 N.W.2d 249 (1977).
12. Carlson v. Olson, ___Minn.
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force contractual or property interests of cohabitating partners
demonstrates the radical shift that has taken place in judicial policy
during this century. Traditionally, courts that denied relief reasoned
that enforcement of such property or contractual agreements between cohabitating partners was against public policy since the agreements were "tainted" by the illicit nature of the parties' relationship." Gradually, however, a doctrine of severance emerged which
allowed separation of the property agreement from the cohabitation
agreement. On this basis courts in several states have awarded relief," concluding that enforcement of the property aspect of these
'

agreements does not violate public policy.' I
One might explain the granting of recovery by certain states as

being attributable to other aspects of that state's law, such as the
presence of common law marriage statutes or community property
laws. However, the existence of such laws in a state does not imply
that the property rights of cohabitating partners will be recognized.
Texas is the only one of the thirteen states recognizing common law
marriage which has extended recovery to cohabitating partners.'

6

There is a higher correlation between the existence of community

property laws and the incidence of recovery by cohabitating part-

ners; four of the states which have allowed recovery are community
property states.' I However, relief has also been awarded in states
which are not community property states.1 8 It appears, therefore,
that reasons other than the existence of common law marriage stat13. See cases cited in note 22 infra.
14. Arkansas, Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, Texas and
Washington. See note 27 infra.
15. See, e.g., Latham v. Latham, 274 Or. 421, 426, 547 P.2d 144, 147 (1976): "We hold
that an agreement such as that pleaded in this case is not void as against public policy."
16. Cluck v. Sheets, 141 Tex. 219, 171 S.W.2d 860 (1943).
17. Arizona, California, Texas, and Washington are all community property states which
have allowed recovery to cohabitating partners. See note 27 infra. Florida, which has also
allowed recovery, is not a communty property state. However, it does have a sort of
judicially created community property rule announced in the case of Strauss v. Strauss, 148
Fla. 23, 3 So. 2d 727 (1941). In that case, the court stated that there is a sound basis for the
community property rule that husbands and wives should share in all property accumulated
during coverture and that the court will apply that rule in Florida where circumstances
warrant.
The correlation between the incidence of community property laws and the award of
recovery to cohabitating partners may be due to the parallel between the policies which
underlie each of them. The policy underlying community property laws is to give effect to
the fundamental equality between the spouses based on the separate identity of each and
the actual contributions made by each to the marriage. The policy underlying the granting
of relief to cohabitating partners is that contributions by each party should be recognized
and protected to avoid inequitable and discriminatory results.
18. Arkansas, Michigan, Florida, Minnesota, and Oregon, none of which are community
property states, have granted recovery to cohabitating partners. See note 27 infra.
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utes or community property laws govern the decision to award relief
to cohabitating partners. This article will direct its attention to these
policy reasons.
II. THE SHIFT TO ENFORCEMENT

Historically, the judiciary has expressed a deep-seated concern for
the preservation of marriage. In 1888 the United States Supreme
Court in Maynard v. Hill' 9 observed that marriage is "the foundation
of the family and of society, without which there would be neither
civilization nor progress."20 Nonmarital relations raised the spectre
were
of social breakdown, and property claims by unmarried parties
2
and to society. 1
court
the
to
challenge"
"audacious
an
as
perceived
Courts that denied relief to cohabitating partners did so on a variety
of theories, most of which were ultimately based on concern for the
preservation of marriage. 2 The primary reason given for denying
relief was that any property agreement between cohabitating partners was so "tainted" by the illicit nature of the relationship that to
enforce such an agreement would be to enforce an essentially imAppeals to the equitable powers of the courts
moral contract.2
the party seeking relief was deemed to lack
since
rejected
were
"clean hands" because of the illicit cohabitation. An alternate theory
upon which relief was denied was the assertion that2 4there was a
Although
presumption of a gift of services between the parties.
courts would grant resulting trust relief when property or funds were
contributed by a cohabitating partner, such a trust would not be
imposed if services were contributed: "[P] ersons living together in a
close relationship perform services for each other without expectation of payment." 2 5 One court reasoned that the parties had full
knowledge of the meretricious relationship under which the property
19. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
20. Id. at 211.
21. Vincent v. Moriarty, 31 App. Div. 484,-., 52 N.Y.S. 519, 521 (1898).
22. Relief has been denied to cohabitating partners in the following cases: Morales v.
v.
Velez, 18 F.2d 519 (1st Cir. 1927); Sugg v. Morris, 392 P.2d 313 (Alaska 1964); Stevens
2d
Anderson, 75 Ariz. 331, 256 P.2d 712 (1953); Hill v. Westbrook's Estate, 95 Cal. App.
599, 213 P.2d 727 (1950); Beckman v. Mayhew, 49 Cal. App. 3d 529, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604
(1974); Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962); Vincent v.
Moriarty, 31 App. Div. 484, 52 N.Y.S. 519 (1898); York v. Place, 75 Or. Adv. Sh. 4475,
544 P.2d 572 (1975); Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wash. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948); Humphries v. Riveland, 67 Wash. 2d 376, 407 P.2d 967 (1965);Wilis v. Willis, 48 Wyo. 403, 49
P.2d 670 (1935).
23. See Stevens v. Anderson, 75 Ariz. 331, 256 P.2d 712 (1953); Welmaker v. Roberts,
213 Ga. 740, 101 S.E.2d 712 (1958).
24. See Hill v. Westbrook's Estate, 95 Cal. App. 2d 599, 213 P.2d 727 (1950); York v.
Place, 75 Or. Adv. Sh. 4475, 544 P.2d 572 (1975).
544 P.2d 572, 574 (1975).
25. York v. Place, 75 Or. Adv. Sh. 4475, -,
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was acquired; therefore, they must have "deliberately made disposition" of such property between themselves and the court should
"leave the parties exactly where it finds them with respect to their

property rights."'2 6 It is apparent that it was judicial concern for the
preservation of marriage that led the courts which denied relief to

conclude that the agreements were tainted, that the parties lacked

clean hands, and that a gift of services or deliberate disposition of
property had been made.

Recently some courts have rejected these theories and found a
basis for relief.2 " The severance doctrine has permitted these courts
to enforce the property agreement as long as it is "separate and
distinct" from the cohabitation agreement. 2 8 Having severed the

property and cohabitation agreement, the issue of morality becomes
irrelevant. 2 9 Once courts have considered the parties' claims to property rights apart from any moral issue concerning the cohabitation
agreement, equity relief has been extended,3 " the presumption of a
gift of services has been rejected,' I and the idea that the parties have
placed property where they intended it to remain has been repudi3

ated.

2

III. MARVIN v. MARVIN

The recent California Supreme Court decision in Marvin v. Marvin 3 I has crested the wave of the judicial trend favoring enforcement
26. Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wash. 2d 345, -,
196 P.2d 835, 839 (1948).
27. Relief has been granted to cohabitating parties in the following cases: Mitchell v.
Fish, 97 Ark. 444, 134 S.W. 940 (1911); Fernandez v. Garza, 88 Ariz. 214, 354 P.2d 260
(1960); Garcia v. Venegas, 106 Cal. App. 2d 364, 235 P.2d 89 (1951); Trutalli v. Meraviglia,
215 Cal. 698, 12 P.2d 430 (1932); Bridges v. Bridges, 125 Cal. App. 2d 359, 270 P.2d 69
(1954); Barlow v. Collins, 166 Cal. App. 2d 274, 333 P.2d 64 (1958); In re Cary, 34 Cal.
App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973); In re Estate of Atherley, 44 Cal. App. 3d 758, 119
Cal. Rptr. 41 (1975); Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal Rptr. 815
(1976); Williams v. Bullington, 159 Fla. 618, 32 So. 2d 273 (1947); Tyranski v. Piggins, 44
Mich. App. 570, 205 N.W.2d 595 (1973); Carlson v. Olson,
-Minn.
-,
256 N.W.2d
249 (1977); Latham v. Latham, 274 Or. 421, 547 P.2d 144 (1976); Cluck v. Sheets, 141
Tex. 219, 171 S.W.2d 860 (1943); Walberg v. Mattson, 38 Wash. 2d 808, 232 P.2d 827
(1951); Omer v. Omer, 11 Wash. App. 386, 523 P.2d 957 (1974).
28. Trutalli v. Meraviglia, 215 Cal. 698, -,
12 P.2d 430, 431 (1932).
29. The court in In re Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973), based its
conclusion that the moral issue was irrelevant on the California Family Law Act, which
provides that no guilt determination shall be made in proceedings concerning divorce or
division of community property. But see note 11 supra. Other courts, such as the court in
In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972) reached a similar conclusion
as to the irrelevancy of the moral issue without reference to any statutory scheme. "We have
disclaimed, and continue to disclaim, any opinion or intended reflection on the moral status
of a couple living in a meretricious relationship." Id. at
-, 499 P.2d at 866-867.
30. Barlow v. Collins, 166 Cal. App. 2d 274, , 333 P.2d 64, 66 (1958).
31. Walbergv. Mattson, 38 Wash. 2d 808,
-, 232 P.2d 827, 830 (1951).
32. In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d 72,
.,
499 P.2d 864, 867 (1972).
33. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
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of property rights between cohabitating partners. In the Marvin case,
the plaintiff, entertainer and singer Michelle Triolla, who had cohabitated for seven years with the defendant, actor Lee Marvin,
brought suit to enforce an oral contract between them. The terms of
this contract provided that they would share equally all property
accumulated by them during the period that they lived together. 4
On defendant's motion for summary judgment, the trial court dismissed the complaint.3" The California Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Tobriner, reversed, holding that the plaintiff's
complaint stated a cause of action for breach of an express contract,
and that the complaint could be amended to state an additional
cause of action on the theory of either an implied contract or a claim
for equitable relief.3 6
The Marvin result is not startling when viewed in light of California cases which have preceded it. 3 ' However, it is the first decision to directly confront the issue of whether awarding relief to
cohabitating parties undermines the state's interest in the protection
of marriage. Courts that have granted relief without specifying the
policy reasons for their decisions may have concluded that it is not
possible to regulate personal relationships judicially, or that such
regulation is no longer important. The Marvin court expressly determined that there is no policy conflict in awarding relief to cohabitating parties.
Although we recognize the well-established public policy to foster
and promote the institution of marriage ... , perpetuation of judicial rules which result in an inequitable distribution of property
accumulated during a nonmarital relationship is neither a just3nor an
effective way of carrying out that policy. (Citations omitted.) 8

This insistence upon judicial respect for marriage while extending
recovery to nonmarried cohabitating partners reveals the conflict in
policy considerations which has long troubled courts asked to grant
relief to such partners. On the one hand, courts have extended relief
recognizing the inequitable results which flow from the denial of
recovery to cohabitating partners. 3 9 On the other hand, these same
34. Id. at 666, 557 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
35. Id. at 667, 557 P.2d at 111, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
36. Id. at 667, 675, 557 P.2dat 111, 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 820, 825.
37. Trutalli v. Meraviglia, 215 Cal. 698, 12 P.2d 430 (1932);In re Estate of Atherley, 44
Cal. App. 3d 758, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1975);In re Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr.
862 (1973); Barlow v. Collins, 166 Cal. App. 2d 274, 333 P.2d 64 (1958); Bridges v.
Bridges, 125 Cal. App. 2d 359, 270 P.2d 69 (1954); Garcia v. Venegas, 106 Cal. App. 2d
364, 235 P.2d 89 (1951).
38. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
-,
547 P.2d 144, 147 (1976); In re Estate of
39. Latham v. Latham, 274 Or. 421,
Atherley, 44 Cal. App. 3d 758, 770 n. 11, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48 n. 11 (1975); Marvin v.
Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 682, 557 P.2d at 121,134 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
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courts view marriage as the bulwark of our society, an institution
-which must be protected in order to assure family stability and social
order.4 0 It is important for courts in a state such as New Mexico
where no cases on this issue have been decided 4 to determine
whether extending relief to cohabitating partners will undermine the
state's interests in marriage, or whether as the Marvin court has concluded, there is no conflict in policy considerations.
IV. THE MARVIN APPROACH
Much of the reasoning upon which relief was based in the Marvin
case has been used or proposed in previous cases.4 The Marvin court
employed the severance doctrine, which allowed the court to find
the parties "as competent as any other persons to contract respecting
their earnings and property rights." 4 It rejected the application of
any guilt considerations to the cohabitation relationship. "[T] o the
extent that denial of relief 'punishes' one partner, it necessarily rewards the other by permitting him to retain a disproportionate
amount of property. Concepts of 'guilt' thus cannot justify an
unequal division of property between two equally 'guilty' persons." 4 4 The court similarly repudiated the presumption of a gift of
services, and instead applied a "fairness in dealing" standard. "There
is no more reason to presume that services are contributed as a gift
than to presume that funds are contributed as a gift; in any event the
better approach is to presume . . . 'that the parties intend to deal
fairly with each other.' "I I Finally, the Marvin court found that
cohabitating partners have expectations which should be honored,
justifying the extension of equitable relief.
40. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 660, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
41. Although New Mexico has no reported case law on property rights of cohabitating
partners, there is precedent concerning the institution of common law marriage. In the case
of In re Galbaldon's Estate, 38 N.M. 392, 34 P.2d 672 (1934), the court held that a New
Mexico statute adopting the common law rules of practice and decision in state courts did
not introduce common law marriage into the state because of the "unique legal and social
history of this State." Id. at 393, 34 P.2d at 673. The court also held that although this
decision might bastardize children of innocent parents, reaching an opposite conclusion in
allowing common law marriages would upset titles and open the door to fraud, "recalling
the ease with which a mere adulterous relation may become, in the mouths of interested and
unscrupulous witnesses, a common-law marriage." Id. at 396, 34 P.2d at 675.
42. See In re Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973); Keene v. Keene, 57
Cal.2d 657, -,
371 P.2d 329, 336, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593, 600 (1962) (Peters, J., dissenting);
Latham v. Latham, 274 Or. 421, 547 P.2d 144 (1976).
43. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 674, 557 P.2d at 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
44. Id. at 682, 557 P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
45. Id. (quoting approvingly J. Peters' dissenting opinion in Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d
657, 674, 371 P.2d 329, 339, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593, 603 (1962)).
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[A] Ithough parties to a nonmarital relationship obviously cannot
have based any expectations upon the belief that they were married,
other expectations and equitable considerations remain. . . We conclude that the judicial barriers that may stand in the way of a policy
based upon the fulfillment of the reasonable expectations of parties
to a nonmarital relationship should be removed. 4 6
The strength of the Marvin decision lies in its clarification of the
policy considerations and legal tests to be used in cohabitation cases.
Previous decisions had contained elusive and nonspecific reasoning
which, as Justice Tobriner pointed out, tended to "hover over the
issue in the somewhat wispy form of the figures of a Chagall painting."'4 The Marvin court, in contrast, articulated the policy behind
its result. First, the court asserted that society in general has come to
accept cohabitation arrangements.
[T] he prevalence of nonmarital relationships in modern society and
the social acceptance of them, marks this as a time when our courts
should by no means apply the doctrine of the unlawfulness of the
so-called meretricious relationship ....s
Secondly, although some previous court decisions had routinely
expressed strong disapproval of "trial marriages," reasoning that such
relationships were no better than contracts for prostitution,4 9 the
Marvin court found such trial arrangements an acceptable justification for cohabitation. "To equate the nonmarital relationship of
today to [prostitution] is to do violence to an accepted and wholly
different practice. We are aware that many young couples live together without the solemnization of marriage in order to make sure
that they can successfully later undertake marriage." ° Finally, the
court rejected the idea that enforcement of cohabitation property
agreements will threaten the institution of marriage, arguing that if
the income-producing partner is allowed to keep all the financial
fruits of a cohabitation arrangement, that partner will avoid marriage
in order to benefit financially. Thus, denial of relief to cohabitating
partners would paradoxically encourage persons not to marry, rather
than protecting the institution of marriage. The Marvin court therefore concluded that "[t] he argument that granting remedies to nonmarital partners would discourage marriage must fail, ... [for to
deny relief would] 'cause the income producing partner to avoid
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 682-684, 557 P.2d at 121-122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830-831.
Id. at 670, 557 P.2d at 113, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
Id. at 683, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
See In re Duncan's Estate, 285 P. 757 (Colo. 1930).
Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 683, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
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marriage and thus retain the benefit of all of his or her accumulated
earnings.' "I '
In addition to clarifying the policy considerations involved in cohabitation cases, the Marvin court attempted to clarify the legal tests
to be used in these cases. One test which the court articulated was
the "fairness in dealing" test previously mentioned.' 2 The court
adopted a new severance test to be used for separating the cohabitation agreement from the property agreement. Previous decisions had
employed a variety of standards in determining whether a property
agreement was so "tainted" by a cohabitation agreement that it
could not be enforced independent of the illicit relationship. 5" The
defendant in Marvin urged that the severance test to be used in this
case should be whether the property agreement was "involved in" or
made "in contemplation of" the cohabitation relationship.5 4 The
court did not accept this test, stating, "virtually all agreements between nonmarital partners can be said to be 'involved' in some sense
in the fact of their mutual sexual relationship, or to 'contemplate'
the existence of that relationship." I Instead, the court adopted the
following test: "[A] contract between nonmarital partners is unenforceable only to the extent that it explicitly rests upon the immoral
and illicit consideration of meretricious sexual services. "56
This test would seem to favor the plaintiff in cohabitation cases,
who might otherwise have a heavy burden in proving the existence of
a property agreement totally separate from a cohabitation agreement, when in fact these agreements usually are interdependent. The
Marvin court did not explain just what "explicitly rests upon"
means. If, for example, it means those agreements which exchange
sex for property rights, only contracts that facially resemble prostitution would be unenforceable. Whether less obvious arrangements
would be covered remains to be seen. It seems likely, however, that
the California Supreme Court will read this standard narrowly to
allow enforcement of most cohabitation property agreements.
The Marvin court's liberal approach in allowing recovery to co51. Id. (quoting approvingly In re Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 353, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862,
866 (1973)).
52. See note 45 supra.
-,
134 S.W. 940, 942 (1911) (collateral to and not
53. Mitchell v. Fish, 97 Ark. 444,
-,
12 P.2d 430, 431 (1932) (a
contaminated by); Trutalli v. Meraviglia, 215 Cal. 698,
part of or in any manner connected with); Hill v. Westbrook's Estate, 95 Cal. App. 2d 599,
213 P.2d 727, 729 (1950) (in contemplation of); Vincent v. Moriarty, 31 App. Div.
484,
-, 52 N.Y.S. 519, 523 (1898) (intimately and immediately connected with).
54. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 668, 557 P.2d at 112, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
55. Id. at 672, 557 P.2d at 114, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
56. Id. at 669, 557 P.2d at 112, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
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habitating partners is also exemplified by its endorsement in dicta of
the use of quantum meruit as a measurement for recovery in these
cases. "Finally, a nonmarital partner may recover in quantum meruit
for the reasonable value of household services rendered less the
reasonable value of support received if he can show that he rendered
services with the expectation of monetary reward."' I Although this
measure of recovery in cohabitation cases has been advanced by
commentators,' 8 quantum meruit has not yet been used to compute
recovery in cases of this type. The Marvin court's recognition of this
measure follows the reasoning in the earlier California Court of
Appeals case, In re Estate of Atherley, s 9 which acknowledged the
value of homemakers' services. Although this measure seems equitable, there may be problems in its application, and objections to its
use in principle. Justice Clark, dissenting in Marvin,6 0 argued that
valuation of such services may be difficult, and that crediting cohabitating spouses with the value of their services places them in a
better position than marital spouses who are not always credited
with such services in divorce proceedings. Despite the Marvin court's
endorsement of quantum meruit, the issue of its appropriateness and
feasibility as a measure for recovery in cohabitation cases remains to
be decided.
V. REASONS FOR THE POLICY SHIFT
The shift in judicial policy towards allowing recovery by cohabitating partners announced in Marvin is partly attributable to a change
in social values. An indication of this change is the significant increase that has taken place in the number of persons who cohabit
without marriage. 6 Whether this increase has been precipitated by
social acceptance of cohabitation, or vice versa, is a circular argument. As Professor Glendon has pointed out, "[t] he more persons in
a particular group 'live together,' the more such behavior becomes
accepted. The more acceptance this alternative to formal marriage
57. Id. at 684, 557 P.2d at 122-123, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831-832.
58. See Folberg & Buren, supra note 3, at 469-470. See also Bruch, supra note 3, at
124-125.
59. In re Estate of Atherley, 44 Cal. App. 3d 758, 770 n. 11, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41,48 n. 11
(1975). This approach also follows scholarly documentation of the value of homemakers'
services. See J. Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose 30-33 (1973).
60. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 686, 557 P.2d at 123, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
61. One commentator estimates that six to eight million people are involved in cohabitation arrangements. Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62
Va. L. Rev. 663, 686 (1976). Recent census figures indicate a six-fold increase from
1970-1977 in the number of couples living together. 2 Research Inst. of Amer., No. 3 (Feb.
28, 1977).
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gains, the more people employ it."6 2 Acceptance has been brought
about not only by prevalence, but also by the awareness that some
cohabitation relationships are undertaken for what are now thought
to be meritorious reasons. As the Marvin court noted, some couples
live together in order to ascertain if they can later successfully undertake a marriage. 6 3 Other cohabitating partners who have legal impediments to marrying at the moment, choose to cohabit until these
impediments are removed. Still other cohabitating persons are recently divorced partners who choose to cohabit since they are "gun
shy" of immediately entering into another permanent relationship.
Finally, some cohabitating partners are older persons who enter into
such living arrangements because social security benefits in some
cases are higher for two unmarried persons than they would be to
them as a married couple. 6 4 That such cohabitation relationships
may not be considered meretricious is revealed by the language from
one New York decision: "[RIesidence together of an unmarried
male and female without the benefit of sermonized marriage is not
per se evil nor one of immorality." 6 I
Another reason for the shift in judicial policy has been the recognition by courts that denial of relief in the past has led to inequitable
and discriminatory results. Not only have reasonable expectations of
property rights been defeated but the harsh results flowing from
66
denial of relief have characteristically fallen on women, not men.
Courts that deny relief, either by finding the property agreement to
be tainted by the cohabitation agreement or by finding the services
rendered during the cohabitation relationship to be a gift, allow the
man, who usually earned the wages during the relationship, to keep
all the earnings. Recognizing this discriminatory result, the court in
62. Glendon, supra note 61 at 686.
63. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 683, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
64. 42 U.S.C. §402(e)(1) (1970): "The widow ...of an individual who died a fully
insured individual, if such widow ...is not married . .. shall be entitled to a widow's
insurance benefit ... ending with the month ...in which... she remarries ... "42 U.S.C.
§402(e)(4) (1970): "If a widow, after attaining the age of 60, marries ....such widow's
insurance benefit .. . shall be equal to one-half of the primary insurance amount of the
is based."
deceased individual on whose wages and self-employment income such benefit
(1975).
405,410
65. S v. J., 81 Misc. 2d 828, 832, 367 N.Y.S.2d
66. See Morales v. Velez, 18 F.2d 519 (lst Cir. 1927); Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d657,
371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962). In the Morales case, the plaintiff female helped the
defendant male to accumulate substantial property for forty years. The court dismissed the
complaint, finding that any services that the plaintiff had rendered were incidental to the
illicit concubinage relationship-and was therefore noncompensable. In the Keene case, the
woman lived with the man for eighteen years, took care of the livestock, helped to clear the
land, and did other substantial ranch chores. The court held that the woman would have had
to have contributed funds, not services, in order to recover, and denied her petition. Cf.
Walberg v. Mattson, 38 Wash. 2d 808, 232 P.2d 827 (1951) where the male partner recovered against the female partner.
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one California case awarded relief because in its view the denial of
relief would "allow a meretricious husband

. . .

advantage over a

meretricious wife simply because in our present state of social development the husband is usually the 'breadwinner.' "67
Changes in legislative policy have also contributed to the change in
judicial policy. Two states have repealed statutes that previously prohibited cohabitation.6 One state has extended property rights to
the surviving cohabitating partner on the death of the other partner,
if the partners had cohabitated for three years prior to one partner's
death.6 9 Even in states where statutes prohibiting cohabitation remain in effect, it can be argued that any moral issue involved in
prohibiting cohabitation is irrelevant to the property agreements
made between such individuals. As Justice Finley in his dissenting
opinion in the Washington case of Humphries v. Riveland7 0 has
argued, "the legislature has made 'illegal cohabitation' a crime ....
But the legislature has not provided that the indicated conduct has
broader implications affecting the right to acquire interest or title to
property.""'
Certainly in states such as New Mexico where cohabitation is punishable only as a petty misdemeanor,7 2 it would seem unnecessarily
severe to deny a cohabitating partner any substantial property rights
on the basis of such conduct. However, in order to determine
whether legislative policy in prohibiting cohabitation should be extended to the denial of property rights to such partners, it is necessary' to examine the state's interests in the regulation of nonmarital
relationships.
VI. THE STATE'S INTEREST

One of the reasons for the judicial trend toward enforcement of
cohabitation property rights is the apparent shift that has taken place
in the state's role in regulating marriage. Professor Glendon has
argued that the state is moving away from regulation of marriage,
citing the current widespread liberalization of divorce laws as one
indication of this trend. 7 3 This is not to say that the state has no
interest in its citizens' unions, but rather that some of these interests
67. In re Estate of Atherley, 44 Cal. App. 3d 758, 770 n. 11, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41,48 n. 11

(1975).
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

1971 Or. Laws ch. 743 §432; 1975 Cal. Stats. ch. 71 § §5, 6.
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 457 §39 (1968).
67 Wash. 2d 376, 407 P.2d 967 (1965).
Id. at
-, 407 P.2d at 980.
N.M. Stat. Ann. §40A-10-2 (1953).
Glendon, supra note 61, at 704.
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are gradually being served without the state requiring marriage. As

for the other interests, it may be argued that the state has found
social rather than legal norms to be more effective in promoting
those objectives; awarding relief to cohabitating partners therefore

will not jeopardize those interests.
Legal regulation of marriage is thought to serve four state inter-

ests: assuring support obligations, assigning responsibility for the care
of children, ensuring family stability, and promoting public mor-

ality. 7 Support obligations are a legitimate state interest since children and nonworking spouses may become the wards of the state if
support obligations are not enforced. Marriage is not necessarily a
prerequisite to protecting this interest, however. The United States
7
Supreme Court in Gomez v. Perez " enforced support obligations

between nonmarried parties, finding a Texas statute that granted
paternal support to legitimate children while denying support to
76
illegitimate children to constitute an "invidious discrimination."

The United States Supreme Court has also held that other economic

benefits, such as food stamps 7

and family assistance benefits7"

cannot be denied to members of de facto families on the basis of
their nonmarital status. 7 9 As economic benefits have been extended

to de facto families, the state has been able to protect its interests in
support without requiring marriage.

The state also has a legitimate interest in seeing that responsibility
for the care of children is assigned. However, courts have decided
child custody cases in situations involving children of de facto families." ° Thus, the state's interest in child care assignment has been
met without requiring marriage.

The state's interest in family stability is of great consequence. As
the United States Supreme Court has asserted, the family is "perhaps
74. Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 Cal. L. Rev.
1169, 1243 (1974).
75. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
76. Id. at 538.
77. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
78. New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
79. As courts are increasingly extending benefits to children of de facto families, the
legal distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate children appear to be losing their
significance. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) holding that
workmen's compensation laws cannot limit benefits to dependent illegitimate children; Levy
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) holding that illegitimate children have the right to pursue a
wrongful death action for their mother's death. Although for the purposes of intestate
succession illegitimate children do not have rights equal to legitimate children; Labine v.
Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), the United States Supreme Court has held that discrimination against illegitimate children will be subject to a review which, although "less than
strictest scrutiny," will be a scrutiny which "is not a toothless one." Mathews v. Lucas, 427
U.S. 495, 510 (1976).
80. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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the most fundamental social institution of our society."' I Sociologists confirm this view for they have found that
[i] n all societies the family has been the prime mechanism for linking individuals to the larger society, for providing them with the
motivation to participate in the economic and occupational structure of society, and for protecting them from the harshness of that
participation by providing affective emotional support and a sense of
8 2
individual dignity and security.
Although some cohabitation relationships may be as stable as formal
marriages, the state cannot be assured that family stability will be
promoted by encouraging such relationships among its citizens. However, it is certainly arguable that extending relief to cohabitating
partners would not result in consequences any different from the
family disruption that the state has already condoned in liberalizing
its divorce laws. It may be that the state will decide that social
pressures rather than legal norms are more effective in promoting the
goal of family stability.a
Public morality, like family stability, may be another state interest
that cannot be met if legal benefits are extended to unmarried partners. Chief Justice Warren Burger stated in a dissenting opinion in
Jacobellis v. Ohio 4 that there is a "right of the Nation and of the
States to maintain a decent society." 8 If this premise is correct, it
would seem that encouraging cohabitation relationships by extending
legal benefits to them would not protect the state's interest in promoting public morality. The courts which have granted relief to
cohabitating partners have not reached this issue since they have
either refused to pass on the moral issue or have concluded that it is
irrelevant. Again, this may be an area where the state will decide that
social norms, rather than legal norms, are the appropriate means to
regulate morality.
The state may also choose to set aside some of its interests in
family stability and public morality. In balancing the state's interests
in these objectives against its citizens' rights of privacy, certain of the
81. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977).
82. Weitzman, supra note 74, at 1242.
83. One court has suggested that relief in cohabitation cases should be awarded only in
those situations where an "actual family relationship" has been established and proved. In re
Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 353, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862, 867 (1973). Although it would seem
that the adoption of this approach would protect the state's interest in the family, the
standard is so vague that any protection offered by this approach may be lost in its application. But see commentators' attempts to define "actual family relationship" more precisely:
Folberg & Buren, supra note 3, at 480. See also In re Marriage of Cary: Equitable Rights
Granted to the Meretricious Spouse, 9 U. S.F. L. Rev. 186, 205 (1974).
84. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
85. Id. at 199.
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state's interests may yield to individual rights of privacy and choice
of lifestyle. The recurrence of individualism in the twentieth century,
With its increased insistence on privacy rights, necessarily collides
with some of the state's asserted interests in regulating certain property rights based on the requirement of marriage. The United States
Supreme Court recognized these individual rights in its 1973 decision
in Eisenstadt v. Baird.' 6 In that case, the Court struck down a Massachusetts statute which allowed distribution of contraceptives to
married persons while prohibiting their distribution to unmarried
8
persons. The Court found that since Griswold v. Connecticut " had
established privacy as a fundamental right for married couples, this
right, if it is to mean anything, must be extended to all individuals,
married or not. Thus, the rise of individualism has contributed to the
breakdown of the distinctions between the married and the unmarried.
This emphasis on individual rights bears out Sir Henry Maine's
thesis that society in its development shifts its emphasis from status
to contract. In his classic text, Ancient Law, Maine asserts that the
basic unit of ancient society was the family, whereas the basic unit of
8
modem society is the individual. 8 Maine traces the movement of
progressive societies as one of gradual dissolution of family dependency with the resultant growth of individual obligation in its place.
He finds that
[s] tarting, as from one terminus of history, from a condition of
society in which all the relations of Persons are summed up in the
relations of Family, we seem to have steadily moved towards a phase
all these relations arise from the free agreeof social order in which
89
ment of individuals.
Thus, to Maine, the movement towards a more progressive society is
the movement from status (the family) to contract (individual agreements). If Maine's thesis is correct, the movement away from the
regulation of marriage, toward enforcement of private agreements
and obligations, as exemplified by the awarding of relief to cohabitating partners, does not portend a breakdown in our social order,
but instead indicates a further step in our evolving social progress.
Thus the state's interest in regulating marriage is diminished as society evolves toward a more progressive social order based on individual obligations.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
H. Maine, Ancient Law 163 (10th ed. 1963).
Id.
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VII. THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS:
AN IRRECONCILABLE CONFLICT?
To what extent, then, are we willing to give up our notions of
status with respect to marriage in order to accommodate individual
rights? Although courts such as the Marvin court have affirmed their
continued support of the institution of marriage, they have apparently found that the state's interests in protecting that institution are
not sufficiently compelling to justify the denial of property rights to
nonmarried cohabitating partners. If some of the state's interests are
now being met without requiring formal marriage, and if achievement of other state interests can be more effectively accomplished
by allowing social rather than legal norms to control personal relationships, what reasons are left for denying property relief to cohabitating couples?
One argument advanced against awarding relief to cohabitating
partners is that judicial intervention is unnecessary since cohabitating
partners are adults capable of contracting between themselves to
protect their interests without judicial assistance. 9 0 Such an argument ignores the realities of the ways in which people deal with each
other in personal relationships, especially in cohabitation arrangements. Most couples, married or unmarried, are not sophisticated
enough to formulate agreements specifying in advance the economic
consequences of separation. Moreover, the nature of most cohabitation arrangements does not lend itself to such specification since
many are undertaken on a trial basis, postponing future planning
decisions until the relationship has stabilized or ripened to a point
where such planning is more appropriate. Thus, it seems sensible to
award relief to cohabitating partners according to their reasonable
expectations rather than insisting upon a mode of planning behavior
which is uncommon even for married couples.
It has also been argued that allowing recovery to cohabitating
partners will increase the workload of the already overburdened
courts. 9 1 If the concern in this argument is that fraudulent claims
may be advanced, the burden of proof required for recovery 9 2 and
90. Weitzman, supra note 74, at 1276.
91. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 686, 557 P.2d at 124, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 833 (Clark,
J., dissenting).
92. For express contract, plaintiff must show express agreement. For implied contract,
plaintiff must show the parties' agreement through inference from factual circumstances.
For resulting trust, in which intent is inferred from the accompanying facts and circumstances, plaintiff must usually establish intent by clear and convincing evidence. See Bogert
& Bogert, Handbook of the Law of Trusts, §74 at 279 (5th ed. 1973). For constructive
trusts, in which actual agreement or intention are not required, plaintiff must prove that the
circumstances under which property was acquired make it inequitable that it should be
retained by he who holds legal title.
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the statute of frauds,9 ' where applicable, will militate against any
fraudulent awards. If, however, the concern is just that the court
dockets will be more crowded, such a "floodgates" argument should
not be allowed to defeat otherwise legitimate claims of parties to
cohabitation lawsuits.
Finally, since the law remains generally an important normative
force, it can be argued that the granting of relief to cohabitating
partners may have unanticipated and undesirable effects on family
stability and public morality. In balance, however, the awarding of
relief may have other desirable results which outweigh these uncertainties, such as the encouragement of fair dealings, the keeping of
promises between cohabitating partners, and the avoidance of inequitable and discriminatory results which flow from denial of relief.
Despite judicial decisions awarding or denying relief, Americans have
94
nor have
not engaged in a mass exodus from formal marriage,
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ings rather than on court decisions.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Some of the state's interests in the economic and child-related
consequences of cohabitation are now being served without requiring
formal marriage. Furthermore, persons continue to cohabit despite
legal and judicial sanctions. The time indeed has come, as the Marvin
court concluded, to realize that denial of property relief to cohabitating partners in order to protect the institution of marriage is
neither just nor effective. Faced with the competing interests of
individuals in their privacy and of states in regulating personal relationships, it appears from decisions such as Marvin that individual
rights have prevailed. This does not mean that marriage is no longer
93. Normally the statute of frauds is not a barrier to cohabitation agreements, since such
agreements are usually based on a contingency, such as the separation of the partners, which
could happen within the year after the agreement is made. "Oral agreements to continue to
do some particular act until the happening of a certain contingency, such as the termination
of a specified existing state of affairs, are valid if the contingency is one which may happen
within the year, although it is possible that it may not happen within that time, and
although it actually does not take place until after the expiration of the year." 37 C.J.S.
Stat. of Frauds §54 (1943). The doctrine of part performance may also remove cohabitation agreements from the statute of frauds if the acts done are "clear and definite and
" 37 C.J.S. Stat. of
unequivocal, and ... done strictly with reference to the contract ..
Frauds §250 (1943). Implied agreements are not subject to the statute of frauds.
94. Glendon, supra note 61, at 688.
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important as an institution in American society, but that enforcement of property rights between cohabitating partners does not
threaten that institution. Instead, enforcement of these rights will
inject responsibility and fairness into the dealings between cohabitating partners.
It is too early to predict how many other states will follow the
Marvin approach, although one state has already done so. 9 Mr.
Mitchelson, attorney for the plaintiff in the Marvin case, predicts
that the Marvin approach will be adopted in every state in the Union
within five years.9 6 Whether or not this prediction is correct, it
appears that, with or without legislative concurrence, cohabitation
has finally "arrived" on the judicial scene.
J. McLAUGHLIN McKAY

95. Carlson v. Olson, __
Minn. , 256 N.W.2d 249 (1977).
96. The MacNeil/Lehrer Report, The Wages of Sin, Show #3050, Library #510 (Sept. 9,
1977).

